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A B S T R A C T
This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for assessing the inﬂuence of risk in
shaping the governance form in biopharmaceutical inter-ﬁrm relationships. In particular,
we propose a multidimensional operationalization of relational and performance risk and,
by following Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Real Options (RO) theory constructs,
we hypothesize a relation between the aforementioned risk components and the choice of
governance form. Speciﬁcally, following TCE reasoning, we hypothesize that a high level of
relational risk leads towards more hierarchical governance forms, while, following RO
theory, we hypothesize that a high level of performance risk leads toward market-oriented
governance forms; ﬁnally, we hypothesize a moderating effect of each risk component on
the other. We empirically test our framework through the analysis of 353 inter-ﬁrm
relationships signed worldwide between pharmaceutical and biotech companies from
2007 to 2010. The results show substantive support for our theoretical framework.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant moderating effect of the performance risk on the TCE
relation between relational risk and governance forms.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Risk evaluation is a key factor in the decision-making process leading to the choice of governance form in inter-ﬁrm
agreements (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Indeed, managers should select the governance form that enables them to maintain the
risk related to a speciﬁc inter-ﬁrm agreement to an acceptable level. However, even though the scientiﬁc literature on
alliances is very rich in terms of contributions examining the drivers inﬂuencing the choice of governance form of inter-
ﬁrm agreements, risk evaluation is still underdeveloped. Indeed, by starting with Transaction Cost Economies (TCE)
(Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991), scholars have primarily focused on issues such as investment speciﬁcity and uncertainty.
Both of these drivers increase transaction costs and, consequently, call for more hierarchical governance forms. However,
while the inﬂuence of investment speciﬁcity has been largely acknowledged by empirical literature (David & Han, 2004),
the inﬂuence of uncertainty on the choice of governance form is still quite controversial (Mahoney, 1992). Indeed, unlike
TCE scholars, Real Options (RO) researchers (Myers, 1977; Kogut, 1991; Folta, 1998) argue that uncertainty leads ﬁrms to
prefer more ﬂexible and less hierarchical governance modes in order to avoid the opportunity cost of irreversible
investments in shared ventures (Folta, 1998). Recently, Santoro and McGill (2005) and Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and
Duysters (2009) investigated how these different views on transaction uncertainty inﬂuence the choice of governance
forms between market and hierarchy. Both papers show controversial support for the two theoretical strands.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 09123861831; fax: +390917099973.
E-mail address: giovanni.perrone@unipa.it (G. Perrone).
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paper we want to move the discussion to the risk concept that, while in some way related to uncertainty, is quite different
from it. Several scholars, starting from the seminal work of Knight (1921), have addressed the difference between risk and
uncertainty. Furthermore, TCE scholars have always located the perception of opportunism risk as a key issue in deﬁning
the governance form (Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994). However, in spite of this, few works
focus on how risk inﬂuences the governance of inter-ﬁrm agreements. Nooteboom (1996) developed a model explicating
the determinants of opportunism risk and its inﬂuence on the governance structure. Some recent contributions concern the
inﬂuence of risk on the stability of alliances (Jiang, Li, & Gao, 2008) and on the choice between contractual mechanisms
(control) and non-contractual mechanisms (such as trust) in alliances (de Man & Roijakkers, 2009). However, the most
signiﬁcant contribution concerning how risk inﬂuences governance structure certainly comes from work conducted by Das
and Teng (1996, 1998, 2001).
Das and Teng (2001) explain that risk is central in the inter-organizational governance decision-making process. Indeed,
one mechanism to control risk is actually the choice of alliance structure, which may either mitigate or add to the risk level.
Thus, the rational choice of an alliance structure should keep the total risk level of the alliance from being inordinately high.
Starting from these considerations, Das and Teng (2001) develop a theoretical framework linking two risk dimensions, i.e.
relational and performance risk, with four types of governance forms.
Although the framework proposed by Das and Teng (2001) is original in deﬁning a relationship between risk
dimensions (performance and relational) and governance structures, it has several limitations. First, from a theoretical
point of view, it does not provide a theoretical construct linking risk with the most acknowledged theoretical strands
such as TCE and RO; thus, the question of how risk is related to inter-ﬁrm literature has yet not been fully addressed
from a theoretical point of view. Secondly, the framework, which is still not exhaustive, remains basically a theoretical
one, since it has never been operationalized or, overall, empirically tested. Indeed, very few empirical papers deal with
risk appraisal in governance form choice. Delerue (2004) develops a framework linking managers’ perceptions of
relational risk in alliances with three situational factors: the degree of relational capital, the structure of the relationship
and the degree of asymmetries between partners. Afterwards, she tests the framework using a survey dataset on
partnerships of European biotechnology ﬁrms. Delerue and Simon (2009) empirically analyse the inﬂuence of cultural
differences in relational risk perception in biopharmaceutical alliances. Through a multiple-case-study investigation, de
Man and Roijakkers (2009) study how relational and performance risk determine the mix between control and trust in
inter-ﬁrm agreements. Thus, it is notable that no empirical contributions to date have investigated how to
operationalize relational and performance risk, or how these risk components inﬂuence the choice of governance
structure.
In this paper we contribute to the inter-ﬁrm relationship literature by ﬁlling the two aforementioned gaps. First, we
propose a framework that provides a theoretical construct linking relational and performance risk with the choice of inter-
ﬁrm governance forms by applying TCE and RO theory strands in a discriminating fashion. In this way, we also contribute to
the literature on TCE and RO theory by opening a discussion on the relation between theories and risk. Secondly, we
operationalize our theoretical framework and empirically test it within the biopharmaceutical context. Thus, we also
contribute to understanding of the risk concept by providing an operationalization of relational and performance risk within
a high-tech industry such as biopharmaceuticals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical framework; Section 3
explains why we have chosen to use the biopharmaceutical industry for our empirical analysis and how we
operationalize our framework in such an industrial context; Section 4 presents the dataset and the model used for the
empirical analysis, while Section 5 discusses the results of the analysis; ﬁnally, Section 6 presents implications and
conclusions.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Several authors have stressed that risk is quite different from uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Nooteboom, Berger, &
Noorderhaven, 1997; Das & Teng, 2001; Delerue, 2004). The most interesting distinction between risk and uncertainty is
certainly that proposed by Knight (1921). In the Knightian sense, risk is different from uncertainty because the former
applies to situations in which we do not know the outcome of a given situation, though we can estimate the odds, while the
latter applies to situations in which we cannot know all the information we need in order to make an odds estimation in the
ﬁrst place. TCE- and RO-theory scholars also refer to the concept of ‘‘Knightian risk’’. RO-theory scholars (Adner & Levinthal,
2004; Rese & Roemer, 2004) agree that RO uncertainty refers to Knightian risk because an uncertain realization of future
environmental states can be derived from an ex-ante speciﬁed probability distribution. On the other hand, TCE, focusing on
bounded rationality, seems to be agnostic when marking a difference between risk and uncertainty (Leiblein, 2003).
However, TCE deﬁnes a means by which to measure opportunism risk through transaction cost estimation. Indeed, David
and Han (2004) ﬁnd that out of over 238 TCE empirical papers concerning transaction cost estimation, 19% measure asset
speciﬁcity (specialized assets and skills), 15% measure technology, demand and price volatility, and 9% measure interaction
among the above items. Thus, transaction cost measurement represents a means by which to estimate the risk associated
with an inter-ﬁrm transaction. Moreover, both theories highlight the importance of risk when dealing with inter-ﬁrm
agreements. TCE claims opportunism risk as the main source of inter-ﬁrm agreement failure, while RO theory emphasizes
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with a particular investment. However, while both theories emphasize the role of risk in shaping governance form choice,
neither TCE nor RO scholars have developed a theoretical framework linking risk and governance form choice according to
the two theoretical strands.
On the other hand, in our opinion, Das and Teng (1998, 2001) provide sufﬁcient explanation for why risk is central in the
inter-ﬁrm governance decision-making process. Indeed, alliances are seen as a means by which to face the (exogenous) risk
of uncertain investments, technologies, marketing decisions and so forth. However, inter-ﬁrm agreements themselves are
sources of possible (endogenous) risk; therefore, the choice of governance form has to balance exogenous and endogenous
components so as to minimize the overall risk. In inter-ﬁrm agreements, it is possible to distinguish between two
components of risk (Das & Teng, 2001): relational risk and performance risk. Relational risk is the probability and consequence
of a lack of cooperation between partner ﬁrms. It is linked to endogenous factors, which, being embedded in the speciﬁc
relationship, can be controlled by partners’ actions (Lo Nigro & Abbate, 2011). Thus, this risk comes from the possibility that
partners will behave opportunistically. On the other hand, performance risk refers to the factors that may jeopardize the
success of an alliance, even when the partners fully cooperate. Thus, it is related to exogenous factors inherent in the activity
that is taking place, regardless of whether partners behave as agreed or not. Thus, by arguing on each governance structure,
Das and Teng (2001) hypothesize a relation between risk components and governance forms: joint ventures (JVs) ﬁt a
situation of low relational and performance risk; minority equity alliances/bilateral contract-based alliances are related to
low/high performance risk and high/low relational risk; and ﬁnally, unilateral contract-based alliances are suitable when
both risk typologies are high.
However, while we do agree with Das and Teng (2001) that the critical role of relational and performance risk are critical
drivers for governance choice, we think that the relation between the two risk components and the governance mode is to be
found in the TCE and RO constructs. Thus, in the following we deeply investigate the concept of relational and performance
risk and, afterwards, formulate our theoretical framework.
2.1. Relational risk
Relational risk exists because the inter-ﬁrm relationship does. Indeed, it depends on the probability that a partner ﬁrm
will not commit itself in the desired manner, and on the consequences of this (Das & Teng, 1996). This risk arises from the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour from one or both ﬁrms (Williamson, 1975). Examples of opportunistic behaviour are
shirking or cheating the partner, distorting or hiding information, illegitimately obtaining assets from the other ﬁrm, and so
on. This kind of behaviour is very common; thus, ﬁrms tend to try and prevent it by controlling partners’ behaviours and
detailing explicit deterrents within contracts.
Several factors may enhance the perception of relational risk, for example expected inequities regarding payoffs of the
alliance (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Hart & More, 1990), differences in terms of bargaining power of the partner ﬁrms
(Williamson, 1993), lack of trust in the partner’s competences and skills (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), lack of conﬁdence
in the good faith of the partner (Gulati, 1995; de Man & Roijakkers, 2009), and also factors relating to different cultural
background (Oxley, 1997; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Delerue & Simon, 2009). All of these elements lead to a higher perception
of relational risk.
2.2. Performance risk
Performance risk depends on several factors that might prevent the strategic objectives of an alliance to be achieved,
despite ﬁrms’ full cooperation (Das & Teng, 1996). These factors include changes in the competitive environment, such as
intensiﬁed competition and new entrants; changes in the general environment, for example in regulations and government
policies; and changes in the internal environment, such as the lack of a particular competence due to the advent of a new
technology. Of course, performance risk strongly depends on the objectives of the partnership; namely, if they are
cooperating in technology development in R&D-intensive industries, the performance risk embedded in this kind of activity
is high in itself. Thus, according to the alliance objectives and types, there are different sources of performance risk in inter-
ﬁrm relationships. For example, R&D risk is the most important risk component in R&D alliances, while commercial risk is
the most important in marketing and commercialization alliances, and international risk is an important factor when partner
ﬁrms belong to different countries. Thus, no matter what the level of cooperation among the alliance partners, performance
risk is always present.
2.3. Theoretical framework
When designing the governance form of an inter-ﬁrm relationship, managers have to choose between different
organizational modes. As highlighted in the previous section, this choice is strongly related to their perception of
performance and relational risk. The literature has traditionally used different theoretical perspectives in order to explain
why managers choose, for instance, a licensing agreement rather than an equity alliance.
In this paper we focus on TCE and RO in order to examine how and in which way risk perception inﬂuences the choice of a
particular governance mode.
Fig. 1. The inﬂuence of relational risk on governance form.
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As is well known, TCE aims to select the governance form that minimizes the sum of total production and transaction costs.
However, because, on the one hand, the marketplace is characterized by scale and specialization economies, efﬁcient
adaptation, ﬂexibility and residual claimant advantage, while, on the other, hierarchies are characterized by administrative and
incentive limits, TCE generally assumes that simple market contracts provide a more efﬁcient, or lower-cost, mechanism for
managing economic exchanges, compared to hierarchical organizations. Nevertheless, given that, because of bounded
rationality, contracts are often incomplete, the theory holds that in certain situations the costs of market exchange may increase
substantially and surpass the technical efﬁciencies provided by the market; in such cases, ﬁrms should internalize transactions.
TCE scholars associate high transaction costs with opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975, 1985), hold-up problems (Klein,
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), residual appropriation (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973), asset rent seize (Grossman & Hart, 1986) and
appropriation concern (Oxley, 1997). As previously highlighted, all the above-mentioned sources of transaction costs arise from
the relation between the parties involved in the agreements. Thus, for our purpose, TCE focuses on relational risk and assumes
transaction costs to be a Knightian measure of such a risk. Furthermore, it is well known that the TCE approach to the choice of
transaction governance forms is a kind of ‘‘discriminating alignment’’ decision (Williamson, 2000). This implies the need to
match simple market exchanges with simple modes of governance, and more complex exchanges with more complex forms of
organization. Indeed, when the relational risk is low, market-oriented agreements, such as contractual or equity alliances,
should be preferred in order to exploit the marketplace’s potential; on the contrary, when relational risk is high, more complex
and hierarchical governance forms, such as merger and acquisitions (M&A), help to reduce transaction costs. Thus, in
accordance to the above reasoning, we formulate our ﬁrst hypothesis (Fig. 1).
H1. When relational risk is high, ﬁrms prefer hierarchical governance forms such as M&As to market-oriented agreements
such as contractual and equity alliances; conversely, when it is low, ﬁrms prefer contractual alliances or equity alliances to
M&A.
2.3.2. Real options and performance risk
RO are investment opportunities that confer the right, but not the obligation, to take some speciﬁc operating actions in
the future. Thus, under the RO perspective, certain types of investment might be considered as the creation of an option,
which can be exercised at a later point in time using a more integrated solution (Kogut, 1991; Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999;
Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). This approach implies recognition of the existence of opportunity costs
associated with irreversible investments under a risky context. In this scenario, the ability to defer a commitment of
resources under uncertainty can raise the investment value by adding the options value; furthermore, many investments can
create valuable follow-on opportunities, or growth options, that are still valuable. By merging these two perspectives,
deferring today and growing tomorrow, RO theory evaluates the ﬂexibility of small, risky investments by reducing
irreversible investments today while delaying them to the point at which the ﬁrm receives new information regarding
market demand, competitive conditions, the viability of new processes technologies, and so forth. In RO theory, individuals
are rational and risk-adverse decision-makers who are able to forecast a set of future states of the world, to choose among
known sets of alternatives, and to maximize their expected values. This also implies that RO theory recognizes the value of
ﬂexibility embedded in investments with exogenous sources of risk, such as that involved in price and demand volatility or
technological newness, etc. Indeed, these types of risk have an impact on the value of the underlying asset through its
volatility. Thus, unlike TCE, RO theory focuses on performance risk. It is quite evident that the reasoning of RO theory ﬁts well
into inter-organizational decision-making, so that RO have been applied in JV investment evaluation (Kogut, 1991; Folta,
1998; Folta & Leiblein, 1994; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000), R&D alliances (Pisano, 1990) and inter-organizational governance
(Leiblein & Miller, 2003).
In inter-organizational governance decisions, deferring means postponing irreversible investments, such as acquisitions
or mergers, in order to acquire further information that allows for a reduction in the performance risk. On the other hand, less
irreversible investments, such as contractual alliances or equity ones, allows an option to be built that can be exercised in the
future. Following this reasoning, we formulate the following hypothesis (Fig. 2):
H2. When performance risk is high, ﬁrms prefer market-oriented governance modes such as contractual and equity
alliances to hierarchical governance forms such as M&A; conversely, when it is low, ﬁrms prefer M&A to contractual or equity
alliances.
Fig. 2. The inﬂuence of performance risk on governance form.
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It should be noted that TCE and RO theories, looking at different components of risk, are opposite in terms of suggesting
the most suitable governance form. However, as also highlighted by previous contributions (Das & Teng, 2001; de Man &
Roijakkers, 2009), both types of risk can be present in an inter-ﬁrm agreement, and thus the elements put forward by the two
theories impact in an opposite way on the decision-making process underlying the choice of the most suitable inter-
organizational governance form. Indeed, let’s consider the case of a contemporarily presence of high relational and
performance risk. How ﬁrms should select the governance form in this case?
From one hand, according to the TCE perspective explicated in H1, in order to reduce the relational risk, ﬁrms would select
a hierarchical governance form, i.e. an acquisition. However, acquisitions are quite ineffective in reducing the performance
risk; furthermore, they are irreversible investments that increase organizational costs. Thus, in presence of high performance
risk, an acquisition increases the magnitude of the ﬁrm’s losses in case of failure. Therefore, the high level of performance risk
weakens the TCE-based preference of managers towards acquisitions in case of high relational risk.
On the other hand, according to an RO-theory perspective, in order to control the performance risk, ﬁrms would prefer a
delay option, by doing a ﬂexible reversible investment, such as a contractual or equity alliance, postponing the irreversible
one, i.e. the acquisition, further on. However, contractual alliances are ineffective in reducing relational risk because they do
not provide the necessary instruments to lower transaction costs. Equity alliances provide more safeguards concerning the
control of the opportunism risk, but they are still less effective than M&A since do not provide an internalization of the
transaction. Therefore, the high level of relational risk weakens the RO-based preference of managers towards contractual or
equity alliances in case of high performance risk.
According to the above reasoning, we formulate the following hypothesis (Fig. 3):
H3. A signiﬁcant level of performance risk moderates (reduces) the TCE-based relation between high relational risk and
merger and acquisitions. Conversely, a signiﬁcant level of relational risk moderates (reduces) the RO-theory-based relation
between high performance risk and contractual or equity alliances.
A corollary of hypothesis 3 is that in case of a contemporarily presence of high relational and performance risk, equity
alliances should be preferred to both contractual alliances and acquisitions. Indeed, from one side, by choosing an equity
alliance managers would gain more control and monitoring of the activities thanks to their presence in the board of the
subsidiary and to the hierarchical structure of the subsidiary itself, thus reducing the relational risk; on the other hand, they
create a more ﬂexible and less costly organizational structure (if compared with acquisition) reducing the potential loss in
case of failure.
3. Industry motivation and framework operationalization
3.1. Industry motivation
Biotechnology has represented a competence-destroying technology for the R&D activities of the pharmaceutical
industry, because it requires technical skills and knowledge that are fundamentally different from those pharmaceutical
companies had developed until the biotech age advent (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Indeed, Rothaermel (2001) estimatedFig. 3. The moderating effect.
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biotechnology one is between 80% and 100%. However, unlike other industries, the effect of this radical change has not been
disruptive for traditional pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Indeed, despite the considerable technological advantage of new entrants,
incumbents still own important strategic assets in developing such new biopharmaceutical products (Rothaermel, 2001),
and furthermore in marketing and distribution.
This situation has created positive opportunities for collaborations between the new sources of technical expertise and
established ﬁrms (Pisano, 1990, 2006; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). For such reason, since the mid 1970s the
biopharmaceutical industry has been characterized by an increasing recourse to inter-ﬁrm agreements between big
pharmaceutical ﬁrms and small new biotechnology ﬁrms (Hagedoorn, 1993; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006). The basic
explanation for the increasing number of inter-ﬁrm relationships in the industry is related to the extent of strong asset
complementarities between the two types of ﬁrms. On the one hand, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm wishing to commercialize a
biotechnology-based drug needs to acquire the necessary competencies by developing the required R&D capabilities in-
house or sourcing them from outside, i.e. from a biotechnology ﬁrm (Chiesa & Toletti, 2004). On the other hand, a biotech
company that has developed a new compound or a technological platform and wants to bring it into the market often lacks
critical functions or capabilities, such as those relating to drug manufacturing and marketing. According to McCutchen and
Swamidass (2004), biotechnology ﬁrms are, in fact, ‘‘functionally incomplete’’.
Furthermore, pharmaceutical ﬁrms have been facing threats such as increased R&D costs and a decline in R&D
productivity (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Bradﬁeld & El-Sayed, 2009), the expiration of numerous patents,
exhaustion of old technologies and increasing competition from generic pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Conversely, biotechnology
ﬁrms have technological assets that make it possible to face such threats (Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2007).
Finally, a very important source of complementarities is on the ﬁnancial side. Indeed, the drug development process is
long, costly and highly uncertain: it requires 10–15 years from research to market, and costs vary from US$ 800 million
(DiMasi et al., 2003; Goozner, 2004) to US$ 1.2 billion for a biopharmaceutical drug (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007).
Furthermore, out of 100 drug candidates, only one or two are launched into the market. Thus, it is easy to understand that
ﬁnancing is extraordinarily important for high-tech industries in general, and for the biotech industry in particular, so that
young biotech start-ups usually obtain ﬁnancial capital by entering into strategic deals with other ﬁrms (Pisano, 2006;
Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, & Santoro, 2008). In the other respect, more mature companies can rely on the commercialization
of products and technologies, as well as intellectual assets (i.e. patents) and service sales. However, Pisano (2006) highlights
how, despite the commercial success of companies such as Amgen and Genentech, most biotechnology ﬁrms earn no proﬁt.
Finally, beyond the lack of ﬁnancial capital of biotech ﬁrms, which is absolutely essential for carrying out their activities,
biotech ﬁrms also use alliances as a signalling mechanism of their value in order to improve their market evaluation (Janney
& Folta, 2003). On the other hand, established pharmaceutical ﬁrms have large amounts of ﬁnancial resources, due to their
blockbusters and their long presence in the market. Thus, entering into agreements with pharmaceutical ﬁrms represents an
extremely important strategic tool for biotech companies (Pisano, 2006).
All the aforementioned complementarities provide reasons for pharmaceutical and biotech companies to cooperate. This
is the reason why, starting from the seminal work of Pisano (Pisano, 1990), several scholars (Folta, 1998; Steensma &
Fairbank, 1999; Santoro & McGill, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006; Rosiello, 2007; Dunne,
Gopalakrishnan, &, Scillitoe, 2009; de Man & Roijakkers, 2009; Van de Vrande et al., 2009) have used this industry as test-bed
for investigating governance form choices in inter-ﬁrm relationships.
3.2. Framework operationalization
3.2.1. Relational risk operationalization
According to Das and Teng (2001), relational risk reﬂects decision-makers’ concerns about the level of cooperation
between partners. According to TCE scholars, partners’ cooperation levels are threatened by opportunistic behaviour
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), hold-up problems (Klein et al., 1978), residual appropriation (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973), asset rent
seize (Grossman & Hart, 1986) and appropriation concern (Oxley, 1997). On the other hand, partners’ levels of cooperation
are improved by trust (Gulati, 1995) and ﬁrms’ familiarity with inter-ﬁrm relationships. Thus, in line with these
considerations, we detect the following factors as main drivers of relational risk perception: investment speciﬁcity, partners’
asymmetry, lack of trust, lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience.
3.2.1.1. Investment speciﬁcity. TCE emphasizes the role of transaction-speciﬁc investments in determining high levels of
opportunistic behaviour. As deﬁned by Williamson (1975), asset speciﬁcity is the extent to which investments made to
support a particular transaction have a higher value within the transaction than they would have if they were redeployed for
any other purpose. According to TCE, the more an investment is relation-speciﬁc, the higher will be the sunk costs associated
with the relationship. The more such costs are not equally balanced between the partners, the higher the probability that one
partner will act in an opportunistic way in terms of trying to seize the other partner’s rent. Thus, highly relation-speciﬁc
investments might increase the expected inequities of payoff in a relationship, and therefore, according to Das and Teng
(2000), they are related to relationship risk. David and Han (2004) provide strong empirical support that asset speciﬁcity
inﬂuences transaction costs; indeed, the extent of asset speciﬁcity increases transaction costs and creates greater
opportunism risk, and thus higher relational risk. In this case, TCE suggests that the transaction should be internalized in
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specialization in inﬂuencing governance form in the biopharmaceutical industry.
3.2.1.2. Partners’ asymmetry. The presence of asymmetry between alliance partners in terms of relative size, different
resources and bargaining power determines an increase in the perception of the relational risk. Several authors (Harrigan,
1985, 1988; Oliver, 1990; Parkhe, 1991; Bleeke & Ernst, 1995; Das & Teng, 2001) observe that inequality between parties,
which allows the stronger ﬁrm to exercise power and control over its partner, leads the weaker party to perceive high
relational risk. Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggest that bargaining power is a determinant in the governance negotiation
outcome, so that the most powerful ﬁrm has the possibility to negotiate the transaction in its favour by improving asset and
transaction rents. Thus, according to the TCE framework, the stronger the partners’ asymmetry, the higher the risk of possible
opportunistic behaviour, such as asset rent seizure and/or residual appropriation, from the stronger party. Finally, Delerue
(2004) ﬁnds partners’ asymmetry to be one of the main sources of relational risk in the biopharmaceutical industry.
3.2.1.3. Lack of trust. Trust in inter-ﬁrm agreements has received a huge amount of contributions as a key driver inﬂuencing
governance form choice (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Relational and TCE scholars suggest that successful alliances result from
characteristics such as trust, reputation, commitment, cooperation and communication (Williamson, 1971; Dyer & Singh,
1998; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). In particular, trust and reputation establish norms and expectations about appropriate
behaviour, lowering the perception of relational risk. Authors such as Parkhe (1993) and Gulati (1995) suggest that trust can
be a substitute for hierarchical contracts in many exchanges, and serves as an extra-contractual control mechanism by
reducing the perception of relational risk. Indeed, the familiarity established among partners mitigates the hold-up risk and,
therefore, reduces relational risk. Gulati (1995) ﬁnds empirical evidence to support this view. In addition, Ring and Van de
Ven (1994) show that trust is an essential condition for market transactions. In the same way, the lack of trust among
partners determines higher behavioural uncertainty, namely relational risk perception, thereby increasing the need for
costly monitoring and control of hierarchical governance (Santoro & McGill, 2005). Finally, trust has been deeply
investigated as a driver inﬂuencing governance form choice in the biopharmaceutical industry (Santoro & McGill, 2005;
Delerue, 2004; Van de Vrande et al., 2009).
3.2.1.4. Lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience. The collaboration propensity of a ﬁrm might inﬂuence the relational risk
perception. Indeed, having a successful partnership history should determine a higher level of conﬁdence about the success
of the new relation, and the experience of past alliances enables partner ﬁrms to accumulate valuable knowledge about
alliance management (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Kale and Singh (2007) ﬁnd that alliances offer great learning
opportunities for ﬁrms to develop their capabilities. Other studies have found evidence that ﬁrms learn to manage alliances
more effectively over time (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997). We argue that inter-ﬁrm agreement
experience has a double effect in reducing relational risk. The ﬁrst effect, based on dynamic capability theory, looks at the
point of view of a company that has experienced several inter-ﬁrm relationships, and suggests that such experience
increases its conﬁdence about its capabilities in managing such relationships (Wang & Zajac, 2007). For instance, Villalonga
and McGahan (2005) show how former alliance and acquisition experience increases the number of the same typology of
inter-ﬁrm agreements. The second effect, based on TCE argumentations, is from the partner’s point of view, stating that the
higher the number of relationships the counterpart has been involved in, the higher its reputation in terms of being a good
partner for a relationship. From this perspective, Teng and Das (2008) argue that inter-ﬁrm experience helps to build trust
among the partners. Indeed, the more inter-ﬁrm relationships a partner is involved in, the higher the possibility they will
behave correctly in relating with other subjects; thus, this kind of trust reduces the need for contractual safeguards and
therefore lowers transaction costs, pushing toward less integrated solutions. At the same time, the lack of inter-ﬁrm
experience determines a higher perceived relational risk, leading to more structured and integrated governance forms.
Finally, both Van de Vrande et al. (2009) and Santoro and McGill (2005) use ﬁrm’s experience in previous relationships as a
control variable in studying the choice of governance mode in the biopharmaceutical industry. However, up to now, former
inter-ﬁrm agreement experience has not been related to relational risk in any empirical study involving the
biopharmaceutical industry.
3.2.2. Performance risk operationalization
According to Das and Teng (2001), performance risk in strategic alliances is the probability and consequences of a ﬁrm’s
failure to achieve its strategic objectives, despite full cooperation, i.e. when the relational risk is assumed to be non-existent.
Performance risk arises from drivers such as market demand and prices, commercial and technological risk, R&D risk,
international risk, corporate risk and strategic risk. Coherently, we operationalize performance risk as follows.
3.2.2.1. Technology/product newness. Technology/product newness is one of the main sources of performance risk. The
newer the technology involved in the agreement, no matter what the level of cooperation among the partners, the higher the
risk of not gaining the expected results. Indeed, Ahuja and Lampert (2001) note that when technology is in an early stage of
development, its basic concepts stem from practice, thereby raising the uncertainties associated with it. This is particularly
true in the biopharmaceutical industry, where speciﬁc applications from chemistry, functional genomics and bioinformatics
are combined to target and test new molecules, making applications in therapeutics more uncertain than those in
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sub-ﬁelds. According to this, Lambe and Spekman (1997) ﬁnd that the presence of biotech compounds in early stages of
development makes performance risk particularly high. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) suggest that pharmaceutical ﬁrms
seeking early-stage research may incur high performance risk. Also, RO-theory scholars point out technology newness as a
signiﬁcant form of performance risk, especially in the biopharmaceutical industry (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Folta (1998)
highlights that technology newness is one of the main reasons why a technology investment might turn out to have little
value. Leiblein (2003) evidences how technology newness also increases the risk of obtaining the desired performance
because of the weak, or still unknown, appropriability regimes and signiﬁcant inter-generational knowledge spillovers.
Janney and Dess (2004) show that the uncertainty surrounding new radical technologies should be addressed by the
investing ﬁrm through small initial investments – so-called ‘‘learning investments’’ – in order to gradually acquire the
knowledge and the information needed to reduce the performance risk.
3.2.2.2. Technological distance. Dissimilarities between the knowledge bases of two partners might have signiﬁcant
implications on performance risk. Indeed, large dissimilarities lead to limited capabilities to detect, assimilate and integrate
technology that is quite different from ﬁrms’ core technologies. This type of problem is typically related to the absorptive
capacity of ﬁrms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), i.e. the more dissimilar the knowledge base of the two partners, the larger the
probability that the absorptive capacity of the investing ﬁrm will fall short, thereby affecting the extent to which a ﬁrm can
recognize and absorb its partner’s technological capabilities. This, of course, increases the performance risk. Also, TCE
scholars note that a greater technological distance makes unintended spill-over of knowledge less likely to happen, thereby
decreasing the threat of opportunistic behaviour; thus, the greater the knowledge base dissimilarities, the less attractive the
integration solution. Furthermore, Oxley and Sampson (2004) argue that high technological dissimilarities, while increasing
the performance risk, reduce the broadness of an alliance’s scope. Conversely, Villalonga and McGahan (2005) argue that a
greater technology relatedness between the two parties implies a lower-cost of integration, due to economies of scale within
the organization, and therefore reduces performance risk. RO-theory authors, such as Folta (1998), ﬁnd empirical evidence
for the relation between technology distance, performance risk and governance form choice in the biopharmaceutical
industry; indeed, he shows that when the knowledge bases of the ﬁrms are dissimilar, companies are more likely to use less
integrated governance forms in order to delay part of the investment until further information is available. In addition,
Pisano (1990) ﬁnds that uncertainty coming from technological distance plays a critical role in pharmaceutical ﬁrms’
decisions to acquire biotechnology R&D from outside. He observes that a ﬁrm that is not yet familiar with the technological
know-how of its partner will manage the performance risk by ﬁrst learning from the partner through arm’s-length
transactions, before being able to accumulate knowledge.
3.2.2.3. Nationality. International alliances are exposed to an additional risk called international risk, which has its roots in
national differences in terms of distance, cultures, regulations, technological standards, and business practices (Parkhe,
1991; Brouthers, 1995). Several authors, such as McCutchen, Swamidass, and Teng (2008), analyse alliance risk in both
domestic and international alliances, and highlight the main managerial difﬁculties linked to the so-called ‘‘international
risk’’ (Miller, 1992). International risk depends on several factors: (i) distance increases coordination costs; (ii) partners in
international alliances have different needs and offer different resources and capabilities (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, &
Borza, 2000); (iii) different legal, institutional, historical and language environments (Lane & Beamish, 1990) make
communication more difﬁcult and increase the chance of misunderstandings between partners; (iv) different managerial
cultures create difﬁculties and lead to alliance failure (Delerue & Simon, 2009); (v) different economies in which partners
operate entail different risks associated with politics, foreign exchange rates and local laws and regulations (Kogut & Singh,
1988) and ﬁnally, (vi) international differences in intellectual property rights protection make it more difﬁcult to manage
R&D collaborations and gain common results such as patents (Oxley, 1999; Hagedoorn, Cloodt, & van Kranenburg, 2005). It is
notable that different nationalities of the partners lead to an increasing level of risk no matter how the partners behave, and
thus different nationalities increase performance risk.
Table 1 summarizes the relational and performance risk drivers discussed so far, by evidencing their inﬂuence on the two
risk components.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Governance forms in the market-hierarchy continuum
In Table 2, we review the governance forms used by the most signiﬁcant empirical literature on the issue. In this paper we
follow the consolidated empirical literature on governance form, and consider three different governance modes. According
to a TCE perspective (Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004; Santoro & McGill, 2005; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005), the governance
form closest to the market is a contractual alliance. This, in our case includes, both unilateral contractual alliances such as
licensing, subcontracting and distribution agreements, and bilateral contractual alliances such as joint production, joint
marketing and promotion and joint R&D agreements.
Then, we consider equity alliances, namely those alliances involving equity exchange in one or both partners. In this group
we consider both minority equity alliances and equity JVs (Oxley, 1997, 1999; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001; Oxley & Sampson,
Table 1
Operationalization of relational and performance risk.
Risk component Drivers increasing risk component
Relational risk Investment speciﬁcity
Partners’ asymmetry
Lack of trust
Lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience
Performance risk Technology/product newness
Technology distance
Nationality
Table 2
Review of governance forms and their coding.
Author(s) and year Governance form codes
Folta (1998) Minority investment (0), JV (1), acquisition (2)
Gulati and Singh (1998) Contractual alliances (0), minority equity (1), JV (2)
Gulati (1995) Non-equity alliances (0), equity alliances (1)
Hagedoorn et al. (2005) Contractual partnership (0), equity JV (1)
Leiblein and Miller (2003) Alliances (any type) (0), acquisition (1)
Oxley (1997) Unilateral contractual agreements (0), bilateral contractual agreements (1), JV (2)
Oxley (1999) Contractual alliances (0), equity (1)
Pangarkar and Klein (2001) Alliance involving purchase of equity stakes (1), otherwise (0)
Sampson (2004) Alliance organized by bilateral contract (1), equity JV (2)
Santoro and McGill (2005) One-way licensing (non-equity) (1), bilateral cross-licensing (non-equity) (2),
bilateral non-licensing (non-equity) (3), minority equity (4), and equity JV (5)
Teng and Das (2008) Contractual alliances (1), minority equity alliances (2), JV (3)
Van de Vrande et al. (2009) Non-equity technology alliances (1), CVC investments (2), minority holdings (3),
joint ventures (4), M&A (5)
Villalonga and McGahan (2005) M&A (1), minority acquisitions (2), JV (3), non-equity alliances in technology R&D or manufacturing (4),
non-equity alliances in marketing (5), licensing arrangements (6), divestitures (7)
Wang and Zajac (2007) No relationships (0), alliances (any type) (1), acquisition (2)
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inﬂuence board decision-making, these kinds of arrangements imply a higher level of interdependence, shared resources and
risk and more formal monitoring and control. Thus, they are also less ﬂexible and difﬁcult to restructure, modify or
terminate. Finally, we consider totally integrated governance forms such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
Indeed, as also reported in Table 2, the rationality of considering acquisition in the biotechnology context is quite
signiﬁcant, because in such an industry, pharmaceutical ﬁrms might have an interest in integrating (acquiring)
biotechnology platforms in order to have the possibility to develop new products later on.
4.2. Data and sample
In order to test the proposed framework, we built our data set by using the ‘‘Biotech & Pharma Collaboration’’ section of
the BioWorld Industry Snapshot database. This data source was used for identifying worldwide inter-ﬁrm relationships
among biotech and pharmaceutical companies during the period January 2007–December 2010. We selected the BioWorld
database because it is a new and reliable source of records speciﬁc to the biotechnology industry, and contains information
about partners’ business names, deal type/objective, product area and ﬁnancial terms. In the period examined, 1781 deals
were included in the BioWorld database. However, our dataset comprises 353 deals and was constructed in the following
way. First, we collected data about all deals signed in the period 2007–2010. Next, we excluded from the analysis 982
agreements for which ﬁnancial terms were not disclosed in BioWorld. Afterwards, we also excluded agreements involving
more than two parent companies, and those involving public research entities, such as universities. Finally, to ensure that
our dataset matched the hypotheses, we checked whether the deal had actually been signed between a pure biotech
company and a pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical one, since many deals had been signed between two biopharmaceutical
companies.
In this way, we obtained our ﬁnal dataset consisting of 353 agreements divided into 216 contractual alliances, 43 equity
alliances (39 minority equity alliances and 4 joint ventures) and 94 mergers and acquisitions.
Once the main information about the agreements were collected from the BioWorld database, we completed our dataset
by integrating information such as partners’ nationality, number of employees, age and main NACE codes from the Orbis
Database, which is a global database containing proﬁles and ﬁnancial information of over 80 million companies.
As far as the international dimension of our dataset is concerned, Table 3 reports the nationality of ﬁrms in our sample,
which are divided into pharmaceutical and biotech companies, and the international dimension of the agreements. Our
Table 3
International dimension of the dataset.
Firms’ nationality
Pharma 353 Bio 353
USA 110 USA 240
UK 50 UK 22
Japan 42 Canada 21
Germany 41 France 13
Swiss 36 Germany 9
France 21 Belgium 7
Italy 7 Swiss 6
Belgium 7 Australia 6
Denmark 6 Denmark 6
Netherlands 5 Sweden 4
Canada 3 Austria 4
Australia 3 Netherlands 3
Ireland 3 Israel 3
Sweden 3 India 3
Israel 3 Italy 1
Korea 2 Ireland 1
India 1 Korea 1
Austria 0 Japan 0
Other 10 Other 3
International dimension of the agreements
Within the same country 30%
Different country but same continent 14%
Different continent 56%
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of the whole sample.
4.3. Variables coding
4.3.1. Dependent variable
The governance form is indicated using G. Following the main literature on inter-organizational governance forms (see
Table 2), we code G as follows: contractual alliances = ‘‘1’’; equity alliances = ‘‘2’’ and M&A = ‘‘3’’.
4.3.2. Control variables
In this study we include four control variables. First, we control for the effects of ﬁrms’ size. Thus, we use two variables, i.e.
pharma size and biotech size, to measure the number of employees in each ﬁrm. Since these two variables present a high range
of variability, we applied a log transformation. Controlling for ﬁrms’ size is quite common in research studies with a similar
purpose to ours (Santoro & McGill, 2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2009).
Secondly, we control for biotech patents, that is the number of patents registered by the biotech ﬁrm in the period covered
by BioWorld database from 2000 onward. We collected patent data both from the publicly available NBER Patent data
(Trajtenberg, Jaffe, & Hall, 2001), for US companies, and from the Espacenet Database for European companies. This provided
us with a continuous variable, to which we applied the log transformation. The inﬂuence of such a variable on governance
form is already well documented. Indeed, patenting is often assumed as a measure of the knowledge accumulated by the
biotech ﬁrm (Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Bosse & Alvarez, 2010) and, also, as a measure of the capacity to ﬁnance its own
activities (Bosse & Alvarez, 2010; Lo Nigro, Perrone, & Chiapparone, 2012). Both these characteristics increase the bargaining
power of the biotech ﬁrm, thereby allowing it to resist possible acquisition. On the other hand, they make the biotech
company an even more interesting subject for acquisitions. Furthermore, in the biopharmaceutical industry many patents
are related to technological practices, such as in the case of biotech technology platform. In such cases, in order to develop
products, the pure biotech still needs the pharma’s expertise in product developing and clinical trials. Thus, according to the
main authors dealing with the topic, we recognise the possibility of the biotech’s patents to inﬂuence governance form, but
do not locate it as an investigation variable.
Finally, we control for the habit of the pharmaceutical company to acquire or to merge, i.e. Pharma’s M&A propensity.
Indeed, dynamic capability scholars such as Wang and Zajac (2007) argue that prior experience of acquisitions familiarizes
ﬁrms with the issues that could arise during the integration process, and helps them to develop routines to solve the
problems arising during such processes. This learned capability makes ﬁrms more prone to be involved in repeated
acquisitions. Supporting this reasoning, Wang and Zajac (2007) ﬁnd that the combined acquisition capabilities of two ﬁrms
have a stronger positive relationship with the likelihood of an acquisition occurrence than the likelihood of an alliance. In the
biopharmaceutical industry, the number of previous M&As signed by a pharmaceutical company identiﬁes its propensity
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should be stressed that we deal with this control variable differently from the lack of inter-ﬁrm experience, which we consider
as an investigation variable. Indeed, the pharma’s M&A propensity could increase the relational risk perception of the biotech
company, however this perception concerns only one side of the relationship, therefore it cannot be related to a relational
risk that, by deﬁnition, should concern both of the parties interested in the agreement. As a measure of the M&A propensity of
the pharma, we consider the number of M&A agreements signed by the pharmaceutical ﬁrm with any other partner in the
period covered by BioWorld, i.e. from 2000 onward.
4.3.3. Independent variables
Independent variables are all related to factors inﬂuencing the two typologies of risk discussed in Section 3.2 and
summarized in Table 1. Concerning relational risk, we identify the following variables.
As a proxy of investment speciﬁcity we consider the log value of the up-front payment the pharmaceutical company pays
to the biotech in all types of alliances. We assume that the higher the value of such payments, the higher the investment
speciﬁcity. It should be said that other studies, such as Santoro and McGill (2005), use asset co-specialization to measure
investment speciﬁcity. Asset co-specialization includes the typology of asset involved in the agreement – thus, for instance,
authors classify R&D agreements as more speciﬁc than marketing agreements. However, we ﬁnd that this methodology is
affected by a high degree of subjectivity, and is very difﬁcult to apply to biopharmaceutical agreements where several assets
(commercial, development and research) are often involved at once. Therefore, we decided to use up-front payments. Such
payments are undoubtedly relation-speciﬁc investments. Indeed, we consider investments having operational (commercial
licensing of a drug; co-marketing; co-manufacturing) or R&D purposes (co-development; co-research). Such payments are
non-refundable, so that when the agreement does not work as planned, ﬁrms cannot recover their investments (in all or in a
great part). This is particularly true in biopharmaceutical agreements, where failed agreements have often incurred legal
actions whose main aim has been the attempt to reduce, through renegotiation or partial reimbursement, such sunk cost
(Newswire, 1996; Krishnan, 2011; Jones, 2009; CHPR, 2011). Thus, according to TCE, up-front payments are a suitable and an
objective measure of transaction costs and, according to our framework, of the relational risk. Having clariﬁed this issue, we
also need to explain what we measure under up-front or irreversible payment. In case of contractual (G = 1) agreements, we
include the up-front payment. In the case of equity agreements (G = 2), we compute the up-front payment plus the part of
equity that is paid in cash when the agreement is signed. Finally, in case of M&A (G = 3) we also consider the part of equity
that is paid in cash when the agreement is signed which, in several cases, is different from the equity as a whole; indeed, in
biopharmaceutical acquisitions, it is quite common for equity acquisition to be done at different times, where a certain
amount is acquired when the agreement is signed, and the remainder at predetermined milestones as certain results are
gained. A good example of this is the 2010 acquisition of Novexel from AstraZeneca, where AstraZeneca agreed to acquire
100% of Novexel’s shares for $350 million in cash payable at the agreement signing stage, and an additional $75 million to
Novexel shareholders if speciﬁed development milestones were reached.
As a proxy of partners’ asymmetry, we develop a measure of the different sizes of the ﬁrms involved in the agreement.
Arino˜, Ragozzino, and Reuer (2008) suggest capturing ﬁrms’ bargaining power by counting employees. Thus, we ﬁrst group
ﬁrms into ﬁve different groups depending on their size and industry1: ‘‘1’’ for micro ﬁrms (i.e. from 1 to 10 employees), ‘‘2’’
for small ﬁrms (from 11 to 50), ‘‘3’’ for medium ﬁrms (from 51 to 250), ‘‘4’’ for big ﬁrms (pharmaceutical ﬁrms from 251 to
750 employees and biotech ﬁrms from 251 to 500 employees), and ‘‘5’’ for big enterprises (more than 500 employees for
biotech ﬁrms and more than 750 for pharmaceutical ﬁrms). Afterwards, we calculate the difference between the size of the
pharma and the biotech.
As commonly encountered in literature, we assess the lack of trust between the same partners through the absence of
previous ties. Based on BioWorld data, we count prior relationships between the two ﬁrms in a 7-year period prior to the
agreement date. Thus, the variable ‘‘lack of trust’’ assumes a value of ‘‘0’’ if the partners reported previous relations; vice
versa it assumes value of ‘‘1’’. So, when the variable increases the relational risk increases too.
As far as the measure of lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience (IFRE) is concerned, the variable is computed as:
[Maxi(ln(IFREi))  ln(IFREi)]/(ln(IFREi)), where Maxi(ln(IFREi)) is the maximum of the log transformation of the number of
alliances (any kind) signed by the generic i-th pharmaceutical ﬁrm in a 7-year period, prior to the agreement in the whole
data set. Hence, when ln(IFREi) reaches the maximum value, lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience is ‘‘0’’; therefore, the
relational risk increases with the lack of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience.
Regarding performance risk, we identify the following measures. As a proxy for technology newness, we identify the
development stage of the product/technology involved in the agreement. As is well known, the drug development process is
composed of four macro phases prior to commercialization: the drug discovery phase, the preclinical development, the
clinical trials (composed of three stages, i.e. phase I, phase II and phase III) and the approval phase. Each of these steps is
complex and uncertain, so that the more advanced the development stage, the more likely the drug would be to reach the
market. It should be considered that even when a drug has completed phase II-A of clinical studies, the expected probability
of success does not even reach 50% (DiMasi, 2001). Thus, the development stage is a good measure of technology newness in
biopharmaceutical agreements. Using both BioWorld data and hand-collected data from public announcements of alliances1 According to the US Small Business Administration Classiﬁcation.
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the product/technology is in the discovery phase or preclinical development; ‘‘2’’ if it is in phase I of clinical trials; ‘‘3’’ if it is in
phase II; ‘‘4’’ if it is in phase III; ‘‘5’’ if it is in the approval stage or phase IV; and ‘‘6’’ if already approved or commercialized.
Thus, as a measure of technology newness we assume the value: ‘‘6 – development stage’’. In this way, technology newness
varies from 0 to 5, so that the higher its value, the higher its performance risk.
As a measure of the technological distance we use a dichotomy variable assuming the value ‘‘0’’ if the pharmaceutical is a
biopharmaceutical company, i.e. a company already integrated in the biotech ﬁeld; in this case the technological distance is
low. On the other hand, the variable assumes ‘‘1’’ where it is a ‘‘pure pharma’’, i.e. a pharmaceutical company that has never
experienced integration in the biotech ﬁeld; in this case we assume a higher technological distance.
Finally, the variable nationality is an ordinal variable that is coded ‘‘0’’ if the partners have their headquarters in the same
country, ‘‘1’’ if they are in the same continent, but in different countries, and ‘‘2’’ otherwise. Thus, the greater the variable
value, the more signiﬁcant the international risk and thus the performance risk.
4.3.4. Methods
Our dataset is a cross-sectional one, where each unit of analysis represents an inter-ﬁrm relationship between a
pharmaceutical and a biotech company. In this kind of analysis, where the dependent variable can be ordered along a
continuum from market-oriented governance forms to hierarchical ones, some researchers have used an ordinal logit model
in order to preserve the ordered nature of the dependent variable (Santoro & McGill, 2005).
However, according to the main literature strand, we do not assume a continuum behaviour of the dependent variable;
thus, we use multinomial logistic regression. Unlike ordinal logistic regression, multinomial allows pairwise comparisons of
each level of the dependent variable versus the baseline (in our case, the baseline is M&A). Hence, since multinomial
regression does not assume a predetermined ordering, the results can provide a more detailed insight when particular
governance modes are preferred over others, depending on the circumstances.
5. Results
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. Collinearity does not seem a problem with our
data (all VIFs are far below 10).
Table 5 shows the regression results, and contains two models. Model 1 aims to test H1 and H2, so it contains only
relational and performance risk variables (main effects). All variables are standardized, so that the coefﬁcients reported in
Table 5 are immediately comparable to one another; furthermore, differences among the coefﬁcients are all signiﬁcant.
Starting with control variables, we ﬁnd that both pharma size and biotech size are signiﬁcant at certain values (respectively
G = 1 for pharma size and G = 2 for biotech size) of the dependent variable, and that they both show positive coefﬁcients,
meaning that contractual and equity alliances are more likely than M&A when the size of the company increases. Biotech
patents is, on the other hand, not signiﬁcant for any levels of the dependent variable. The variable number of M&A is
signiﬁcant at all values of G, and is negative; thus, as argued, the higher the propensity of the pharmaceutical ﬁrm to sign
M&A, the more likely this governance form adoption in biopharmaceutical agreements.
Let us now analyse the results for the relational risk drives (Model 1).
The variable investment speciﬁcity is signiﬁcant for any value of the dependent variable, and its coefﬁcients are negative
and fairly constant across the values of G; thus, according to H1’s formulation, when relational risk increases due to higher
investment speciﬁcity, M&A are more likely than any other governance form.Table 4
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent variable
G (governance form) 1 3
Control variables
1. Pharma size 0.69 11.7 9.1 2.4 3.22
2. Biotech size 0.69 9.8 4.4 1.6 3.67 0.23
3. Biotech patents 0 7.4 1.9 1.8 1.38 0.09 0.48
4. M&A propensity 0 17 2.8 2.9 1.50 0.39 0.00 0.07
Relational risk variables
5. Investment speciﬁcity 0 4.2 1.6 0.8 1.14 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.03
6. Partners’ asymmetry 2 4 1.8 1.2 3.87 0.37 0.67 0.37 0.17 0.02
7. Lack of inter-ﬁrm experience 0 1 0.7 0.3 2.00 0.57 0.12 0.06 0.55 0.02 0.14
8. Lack of trust 0 1 0.8 0.4 1.07 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.12
Performance risk variables
9. Technology newness 0 5 2.8 1.6 1.23 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.01
10. Nationality 0 2 1.3 0.9 1.12 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.06
11. Technology distance 0 1 0.5 0.5 1.09 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.20
Table 5
Multinomial regression results.
Model 1 Model 2
G = 1 G = 2 G = 1 G = 2
Const. 2.06 1.807 4.385*** 4.732***
(1.518) (2.602) (0.218) (1.548)
Control variables
Pharma size 0.494*** 0.173 0.559*** 1.75 0.241 1.27
(0.137) (0.160) (0.145) (0.182)
Biotech size 0.239 0.665* 0.420 1.52 0.877** 2.40
(0.281) (0.348) (0.302) (0.358)
Biotech patents 0.087 0.164 0.094 1.10 0.137 0.87
(0.137) (0.169) (0.169) (0.203)
M&A propensity 0.239** 0.380*** 0.271*** 0.76 0.460*** 0.63
(0.096) (0.111) (0.092) (0.116)
Relational risk variables
Investment speciﬁcity 1.985*** 1.921*** 1.695*** 0.18 1.687*** 0.18
(0.252) (0.341) (0.225) (0.292)
Partner’s asymmetry 0.030 0.807* 0.041 1.04 1.121** 3.07
(0.302) (0.433) (0.359) (0.499)
Lack of inter-ﬁrm experience 0.697 3.313*** 0.134 0.87 0.761* 0.47
(0.302) (1.167) (0.355) (0.436)
Lack of trust 0.132 0.916 0.013 0.99 0.339 1.40
(0.400) (0.666) (0.193) (0.302)
Performance risk variables
Tech newness 0.376*** 0.402** 0.611*** 1.84 0.592** 1.81
(0.134) (0.185) (0.258) (0.293)
Nationality 0.570*** 0.407* 0.370* 1.44 0.186 1.20
(0.188) (0.185) (0.202) (0.238)
Tech distance 0.875** 0.077 0.342 1.41 0.057 1.06
(0.353) (0.473) (0.243) (0.318)
Interactions
Inv. speciﬁcity  Tech newness 0.501*** 1.65 0.497* 1.64
(0.191) (0.270)
Inv. speciﬁcity  Nationality 0.427** 1.53 0.186 1.28
(0.192) (0.238)
Asymmetry  Tech newness 0.306* 0.74 0.142 0.87
(0.200) (0.266)
Asymmetry  Tech dist. 0.131 0.88 0.357 0.70
(0.197) (0.277)
Lack of inter-ﬁrm exp.  Tech dist. 0.662** 1.94 1.005*** 2.73
(0.308) (0.364)
Lack of trust  Tech newness 0.107 1.11 0.632** 1.88
(0.243) (0.290)
Lack of trust  Nationality 0.268 0.76 0.178 0.84
(0.230) (0.267)
Pseudo R2 0.333 0.397
Log likelihood 213.13 192.65
Chi-squared test 0.00 0.00
Number of obs: 353. Reference category: 3.
Relational risk-ratios (RRR) are in italics; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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than M&A when partner asymmetry increases; this is in contrast with our H1 prediction.
Lack of trust is not signiﬁcant for any value of G.
Lack of inter-ﬁrm experience is signiﬁcant at G = 2, and its coefﬁcient is negative, as expected in H1, meaning that equity
alliances are less likely than M&A when the relational risk associated with the scarce familiarity of the pharmaceutical ﬁrm
with inter-ﬁrm relations increases.
In summary, the empirical results slightly support the predictions of H1; indeed, two out of four relational risk drivers, i.e.
investment speciﬁcity and lack of inter-ﬁrm experience, behave as expected in H1; on the other hand, partners’ asymmetry does
not meet the H1 predictions, and lack of trust is not signiﬁcant.
With respect to the estimates of performance risk drivers (see Model 1), the variable technology newness is signiﬁcant at
all values of the dependent variable and, according to the H2 prediction, with positive coefﬁcients. Thus, when performance
risk arises, due to higher levels of technology newness, M&A are less likely than market-oriented governance structures.
Also, the variable nationality is signiﬁcant at all the values of G with positive coefﬁcients. This result conﬁrms H2’s
expectation that when performance risk increases as a consequence of a different nationality, market-oriented governance
forms are more likely than M&A.
Finally, the variable technology distance is signiﬁcant at G = 1 with positive coefﬁcients. Again, according to H2’s
formulation, the greater the performance risk related to the technology distance, the more likely contractual alliances are in
comparison to M&A.
In summary, H2 predictions are satisﬁed in all three drivers characterizing the performance risk.
Model 2 is designed to test H3 (Table 5), and thus it contains interaction effect variables (a moderation effect). In order to
avoid multicollinearity problems in Model 2, investigation variables have been standardized before performing products.
Afterwards, a stepwise procedure has been applied for optimising the model; thus, Table 5 reports only those interaction
variables remaining after the stepwise procedure. In order to allow a comparison of coefﬁcients in Model 2, we report, in
italics, the Relational Risk Ratios (RRR), and we have veriﬁed that all the differences among RRRs are signiﬁcant. The results
for the control variables and for relational and performance risk drivers are substantially the same as in Model 1, so we go
straight to commenting on interaction effects.
The interaction between investment speciﬁcity and technology newness is signiﬁcant for all values of G. In particular, the
RRR coefﬁcients (1.65 and 1.64) are both much greater than those of investment speciﬁcity (0.18 and 0.18), and are lower than
those of technology newness (1.84 and 1.81). The reader can notice how the presence of a high level of technology newness (a
performance risk component) increases the likelihood of contractual and equity alliances over M&A, moderating the effect of
a high investment speciﬁcity (a relational risk component) towards M&A. Conversely, a high level of investment speciﬁcity
decreases the likelihood of contractual and equity alliances over M&A, moderating the effect of a high technology newness
towards market-oriented governance forms. Thus, for these two variables the moderating effects predicted in H3 are
conﬁrmed for all values of G.
The interaction between investment speciﬁcity and nationality is signiﬁcant at G = 1. In particular, the RRR coefﬁcient (1.53)
is much greater than that of investment speciﬁcity (0.18), but it is also greater than that of nationality (1.44). Thus, for these
variables, while the moderating effect of the performance risk variable on relational risk is conﬁrmed, the inverse
moderating effect is not conﬁrmed.
The interaction between partners’ asymmetry and technology newness is signiﬁcant at G = 2. The RRR coefﬁcient (0.74) is
not comparable with that of partners’ asymmetry, because not signiﬁcant. However, it is lower than that of technology
newness (1.84) conﬁrming in this way the moderating effect of the relational risk component (partner’s asymmetry) on the
performance risk one (technology newness). It should be noticed, however, that partner’s asymmetry in Model 1 behaves
differently from what hypothesized in H1.
The interaction between lack of inter-ﬁrm experience and technology distance is signiﬁcant for all values of G. At G = 1 the
RRR coefﬁcient is not comparable with those of the main variables (lack of inter-ﬁrm experience and technology distance)
because neither are signiﬁcant. However, at G = 2, while the RRR coefﬁcient (2.73) is still not comparable with that of
technology distance, it is much greater than the coefﬁcient of lack of inter-ﬁrm experience (0.47), conﬁrming in this way the
moderating effect of the performance risk variable on the relational risk one.
Finally, the interaction between lack of trust and technology newness is signiﬁcant at G = 2. The RRR coefﬁcient (1.88) is
not comparable with that of lack of trust because not signiﬁcant, while it is slightly greater that the one of technology
newness (1.81) not conﬁrming, in this case, the moderating effect of the relational risk component on the performance risk
one.
In Table 6 we report a summary of the results discussed above. Speciﬁcally, in the H3 section, the ﬁrst comment
(conﬁrmed or not conﬁrmed) refers to the moderating effect of the performance risk driver on the TCE-based relation
between relational risk and governance form; and vice versa for the second. Furthermore, NS stands for a ‘‘not signiﬁcant’’
moderating effect, and NC for ‘‘not comparable’’, meaning that while the interaction is signiﬁcant, the correspondent main
effect is not.
Finally, it is remarkably to notice how only two interactions are signiﬁcant for both the G values, that is: investment
speciﬁcity and technology newness and lack of inter-ﬁrm experience and technology distance. While for the ﬁrst couple of
variables contractual and equity alliances are equally more likely than M&A, for the second couple of variables equity
alliances are much more likely than contractual ones.
Table 6
Summary of the empirical results.
Performance risk drivers
Tech. newness Tech. distance Nationality
H2 Conﬁrmed Conﬁrmed Conﬁrmed
H1 H3
Relational risk drivers Investment speciﬁcity Conﬁrmed Conﬁrmed;
Conﬁrmed
NS Conﬁrmed;
Not conﬁrmed
Partners’ asymmetry Not conﬁrmed NC;
Conﬁrmed
NS NS
Lack of trust NS NC;
Not conﬁrmed
NS NS
Lack of inter-ﬁrm experience Conﬁrmed NS Conﬁrmed;
NC
NS
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The research presented in this paper provides interesting contributions both from a scientiﬁc and a managerial point of
view. Our study contributes to the literature on governance form choice in three different ways.
First, in line with other scholars, such as Das and Teng (2001), we consider risk, relational and performance components
as key drivers for shaping governance form; however, unlike Das and Teng (2001), we build a conceptual framework in which
risk shapes governance forms under a TCE- and RO-theory reasoning used in a discriminating fashion. Thus, we build a
theoretical framework that links risk with two of the most important theories used to understand the choice of governance
form in inter-ﬁrm agreements. Furthermore, despite the importance risk has assumed in the governance form choice
literature (Das & Teng, 2001; Delerue, 2004; Delerue & Simon, 2009; de Man & Roijakkers, 2009), no scholars to date have
empirically tested the inﬂuences of both relational and performance risk on governance form choice.
Hence, the second contribution of this paper comes from the fact that we operationalize our theoretical framework and
test it within an international biopharmaceutical environment. Finally, we also contribute to the controversial debate on
how TCE and RO theories inﬂuence governance form choice, by providing new, interesting knowledge about the reciprocal
contribution of the two theories.
Our theoretical framework operationalizes relational risk through four drivers: investment speciﬁcity, lack of inter-ﬁrm
relationship experience, partners’ asymmetry and lack of trust. All of the above components increase relational risk. According
to TCE, we hypothesize that the higher the relational risk, the more likely the recourse to hierarchical governance forms (H1).
By looking at the results summarized in Table 6, H1 receives slight support. Indeed, two out four of the relational risk
components, speciﬁcally investment speciﬁcity and lack of inter-ﬁrm experience, behave as expected, at least when comparing
M&A with other, less hierarchical, governance forms. Thus, according to our TCE reasoning, when relational risk arises as a
consequence of the above components, M&A are preferable over other governance forms. It should be noted that this result is
quite interesting from a theoretical point of view; indeed, while it was expected for investment speciﬁcity, since its inﬂuence
on governance forms is widely recognized in TCE literature (David & Han, 2004), the same cannot be said for the other
relational risk drivers. Certainly, several scholars (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Santoro & McGill, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007;
Van de Vrande et al., 2009) recognize a role of inter-ﬁrm relationship experience in shaping the governance form because of an
organizational learning perspective. Teng and Das (2008), by ascribing to this experience-based component the ability to
inﬂuence partners’ trust, also predict an inﬂuence on governance form. However, no scholars to date have associated this
driver with relational risk and, consequently, highlighted its ability to shape governance form on the base of a TCE construct.
Nevertheless, partners’ asymmetry has not conﬁrmed our prediction. In particular, contrary to our expectation, when
partners’ asymmetry increases, equity alliances are more likely than M&A. Partners’ asymmetry has speciﬁcally been indicated
as a form of relational risk by different scholars (Das & Teng, 2001; Delerue, 2004); however, Das and Teng (2001) highlight
that ﬁrms’ bargaining power cannot be easily captured only by ﬁrm size, since it depends also on resources and market
power. Indeed, Arino˜ et al. (2008), by measuring relative partners’ asymmetry through the difference between the number of
employees, do not obtain a signiﬁcant effect on alliance governance form negotiation. On the other hand, Bosse and Alvarez
(2010), by measuring partners’ asymmetry through a combination of the amount of resources employed in the agreement and
the market access provided by the partner, ﬁnd that the larger the ﬁrm’s bargaining power, the more likely the recourse to
equity alliances over non-equity alliances. Furthermore, Billitteri, Lo Nigro, and Perrone (2013) argue how the number of
products already commercialized by the biotech company inﬂuences the asymmetry among partners and it can also
inﬂuence the choice of the governance form. Therefore, our results could have been affected by the size-based measure we
used. However, there is another interpretation of our empirical results; indeed, while higher bargaining power surely
increases the relational risk, it could also provide the stronger partner with the necessary safeguard for reducing transaction
costs. In the case of biopharmaceutical agreements, where the pharmaceutical partner is usually the strongest one, this could
lead to a preference for equity-based alliances over more risky acquisition forms. If this interpretative key is correct, partners’
asymmetry, while still increasing relational risk, could lead to a less integrated governance form; thus, this point needs to be
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negation for H1. There is a huge body of literature, starting from Gulati (1995), which acknowledges trust as a way in which
to reduce relational risk (Judge & Dooley, 2006). However, while some scholars, like Santoro and McGill (2005), by posing TCE
argumentations, like we do in our paper, conclude that the relational risk reduction, due to trust, makes less integrated
governance forms more likely, other scholars, such as Van de Vrande et al. (2009), argue that higher trust, due to prior
cooperation, can push toward either less integrated solutions or more integrated ones.
In this last case, the reason is that better knowledge due to prior cooperation makes acquisition less risky. Our empirical
results seem to conﬁrm the presence of this double effect that, in the end, makes lack of trust non-signiﬁcant in shaping
governance forms. Therefore, with regards to H1, our empirical results conﬁrm the TCE view on relational risk and
governance forms, but, at the same time, provide a different perspective, with respect to TCE, on relational risk drivers such
as partners’ asymmetry and lack of trust.
H2, by using an RO-theory perspective, predicts that a higher performance risk pushes toward less integrated governance
form. Our theoretical framework operationalizes performance risk through three drivers: technology newness, technology
distance and nationality. From Table 6, it can be seen that H2 is strongly supported by our empirical ﬁndings, since all the
performance risk components behave as expected. In this case, we would like to highlight our contribution concerning the
nationality driver. Indeed, while technology newness and distance have been widely indicated as forms of performance risk
(Das & Teng, 2001), and their impact on governance form choice has been tested by RO-theory scholars (Santoro & McGill,
2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2009), nationality, while still associated with performance risk (Das & Teng, 2001), has not been
tested under an RO-theory perspective to date. Indeed, some scholars (Oxley, 1997; Teng & Das, 2008) have pointed out that
the international risk of alliances increases the appropriation concern and, according to TCE reasoning, leads to a more
integrated solution. However, the empirical results of such an approach are quite controversial; indeed, while Teng and Das
(2008) ﬁnd empirical support for their TCE approach, Oxley (1997) ﬁnds opposite results that are in line with the evidence
we have obtained in our research. Also, while Teng and Das’s (2008) dataset comprises several kinds of industries, with low
evidence of high-tech industries, Oxley’s (1997) and our dataset are largely centred on high-tech industries. Thus, our results
seem to conﬁrm that in high-tech industries, where different nationality contributes to a higher performance risk due to
different appropriability regimes, the RO-theory approach is more consistent that the TCE approach in explaining the choice
of governance form.
Now we come to the H3 results, which, we believe, provide also a signiﬁcant scientiﬁc contribution of our work. Indeed,
H3 states a moderating effect of performance risk on the TCE-based relationship between relational risk and governance
form, and, conversely, the moderating effect of relational risk on the RO-theory-based relationship between performance
risk and governance form choice. By looking at the results summarized in Table 6, the moderating effect of performance risk
on relational risk is conﬁrmed each time we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant interaction (three times), and always with a consistent
variation of the RRR coefﬁcients. On the other hand, the moderating effect of the relational risk on the performance risk is
signiﬁcant only four times with controversial support to H3. Indeed, in two cases the moderating effect matches the
expectation of H3, however in other two cases it does not; furthermore, also in those cases in which the moderating effect
behaves as hypothesized in H3, coefﬁcients variation, while still signiﬁcant, is quite limited. Thus, the moderating effect of
the performance risk on the TCE-based relationship between relational risk and governance form receives strong empirical
support from our data. On the other hand, the symmetrical effect does not.
This result provides two important contributions to the debate between TCE and RO theory in governance form choice.
First, TCE and RO theory are not in contrast to one another, as recent scholars have pointed out (Santoro & McGill, 2005; Van
de Vrande et al., 2009); instead, they identify two different types of risk involved in an inter-ﬁrm relationship. Thus, when the
relational risk is much higher than the performance risk, governance form choice is mostly driven by TCE; on the other hand,
when the performance risk is prevalent, RO theory more accurately informs the choice of governance form. This perspective
is new in the literature on governance form choice, and certainly constitutes an important contribution of our work. Indeed,
although some scholars (Leiblein, 2003; Roemer, 2004) have pointed out that both TCE and RO theory deals with the concept
of risk, no scholars to date have built a theoretical framework linking two risk components, relational and performance, with
the aforementioned theories. Moreover, our ﬁndings provide a sound answer to David and Han’s (2004) evidence on
uncertainty; indeed, the two scholars do not ﬁnd support for the TCE-based construct on uncertainty, since they ﬁnd almost
as much evidence that increasing uncertainty leads to results in the opposite direction to that predicted by TCE. However,
they have measured uncertainty as a mixture of market (price and demand), technology and relational uncertainty.
According to our framework, market and technology uncertainty, by increasing performance risk, lead to less hierarchical
governance forms.
Secondly, the performance risk has a moderating effect on the relational risk, while the moderating effect of the latter risk
dimension cannot be conﬁrmed by our analysis. Indeed, when both the risk dimensions are high, since a hierarchical
governance form does not help to reduce the performance risk, while it increases investment, rigidity and organizational
costs, ﬁrms prefer to adopt an RO perspective. Thus, they prefer to delay binding investments in favour of small learning
investments that reduce the performance risk over time and, at the same time, allow the development of trust among the
parties, which helps to reduce relational risk. This result provides a new perspective about the ‘‘learning investment’’ concept
that has been widely observed in the biopharmaceutical industry (Janney & Dess, 2004; Pisano, 2006).
Finally, it should be also stressed that our research provides a controversial support to the framework conceptualized by
Das and Teng (2001) in their theoretical paper. Das and Teng (2001) predict the use of bilateral contractual alliances when
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alliances are always more likely when performance risk components are high and relational risk are low. Conversely, they
predict the use of minority equity alliances in the case of high relational risk and low performance risk. Our results suggest
that, in such case, more integrated solutions, such as acquisition, are preferred over other kinds of alliances (contractual and
equity alliances), and that no signiﬁcant preference exists among other forms of alliances (see, for instance, the results for
investment speciﬁcity). Finally, Das and Teng (2001) predict the use of unilateral contract-based alliances in case both
performance and relational risk are high. In this case, as already discussed, our results indicate that equity alliances are never
less likely than contractual ones, and in one case they are even more likely. This seems in line with our expectation that
equity alliances, from one side, offer the necessary safeguards to reduce transaction costs in presence of high relational risk
and, on the other hand, allow reducing the failure risk being more ﬂexible than M&A.
Our research shows several managerial implications. First, it contributes to stressing the importance of risk evaluation for
making governance form decisions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretative key for making governance form decisions,
that is: managers should look at two different risk components and try to reduce them by using TCE and RO theory constructs
in a discriminating fashion. Of course, we are not providing normative suggestions to select the best governance form
depending on the risk levels because we are not analysing performances; however, we undoubtedly provide a new
perspective to approaching governance form decisions. Finally, our analysis does not conﬁrm the moderating effect of the
relational risk on the performance risk. This has important managerial implications, because when the performance risk is
higher in a transaction, no matter what the level of relational risk, the RO-theory approach seems to prevail, leading to less
integrated solutions. This evidence also seems to suggest a higher level of managerial sensibility toward the performance risk
that, being unequivocally characterized by exogenous factors, is less controllable by managerial practices.
Finally, our work has some limitations. We have already discussed the operationalization of the partners’ asymmetry
variable, and a more structured measurement of such a variable, as also suggested by Bosse and Alvarez (2010), would
certainly help to provide a better understanding of the role of this variable in our constructs. Furthermore, as far as the
methodology is concerned, we have used a very simple measure of operationalization for the variable technology distance,
while some other, more sophisticated, measure (Van de Vrande et al., 2009) could be used and, perhaps, would improve the
signiﬁcance of this variable, especially in Model 2. Furthermore, we used multinomial logistic regression in our attempt to
obtain more discriminating results among the several governance forms considered in this paper. However, the empirical
results do not provide a clear discrimination, especially among contractual and equity agreements. Finally, our results are
conﬁned to the industry we have examined in this paper.
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